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PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No. 18-2937 
   
ANTHONY MAMMANA,  
                   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; LIEUTENANT 
BARBEN; MEDICAL ASSISTANT TAYLOR; JOHN 
DOES (1-10)  
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. No.: 4-17-cv-00645) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
      
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2019 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion filed August 14, 2019) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
 
The Eighth Amendment is an area of the law that is 
often fact-intensive and can require balancing the rights of 
incarcerated citizens with the administrative judgment of 
prison officials.  This appeal, however, is straightforward.  
Former inmate Anthony Mammana raises a challenge under 
the Eighth Amendment to his confinement in a chilled room 
with constant lighting, no bedding, and only paper-like 
clothing.  The District Court dismissed Mammana’s Amended 
Complaint, reasoning that Mammana had alleged only 
“uncomfortable” conditions.  Because Mammana has 
adequately alleged a sufficiently serious deprivation under the 
Eighth Amendment, we will vacate and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
I. Background  
 
Because the District Court dismissed Mammana’s 
Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), we accept all well-pleaded allegations as 
true.  Those allegations may be summarized as follows: 
 
A. The Yellow Room 
 
Plaintiff-appellant Anthony Mammana was an inmate 
confined at Allenwood Low Federal Correctional Institution, 
serving a seven-year sentence.  During the fifth year of his 
sentence, Mammana began to feel “extreme illness after each 
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meal” and visited the medical ward at Allenwood.1  A 
physician assistant checked Mammana’s blood sugar level, and 
told Mammana “to return the following day after eating.”2  
Over the next several days, Mammana continued to feel ill after 
eating and, each time, returned to the medical ward.  After his 
“fifth or sixth visit,” the physician assistant referred Mammana 
to Allenwood’s psychologist on the belief that Mammana’s 
illness could be psychological in nature.3 
 
The psychologist, however, could not determine the 
cause of Mammana’s discomfort and called the medical ward 
to advise them that Mammana would be returning there.  
However, Medical Assistant Taylor said she would refuse to 
re-admit Mammana to the medical ward if he returned, despite 
having never examined Mammana.  Nonetheless, Mammana 
was escorted back to the medical ward, and after taking his 
blood pressure, Taylor “filed a false report,” accusing him of 
“harassment, stalking, and interference with the performance 
of duties.”4  As a result of Taylor’s report, Mammana was 
transferred to the “hole,” or administrative segregation.5 
 
However, upon learning the identity of his cellmate—
who was known for “his deviate sexual behavior forced onto 
cellmates”—Mammana refused his assigned cell in 
administrative segregation.6  Defendant-appellee Lieutenant 
                                              
1 JA 41. 
2 Id. 
3 JA 42. 
4 JA 43. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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Barben then directed Mammana to be placed into a cell known 
as the “Yellow Room,” which was regarded by inmates as a 
“mental and physical abuse room.”7  
 
In the Yellow Room, Mammana was stripped of his 
clothing and given only “paper like” coverings instead.8  The 
Yellow Room was lit by a “bright light” that “was turned on 
for 24 hours a day” and was kept “uncomfortably cold.”9  
Mammana was provided no bedding or toilet paper and only 
an “extremely thin mattress” to sleep on.10  Consequently, he 
“could hardly sleep and would wake up frequently shivering 
when he did fall asleep.”11  During that time, Mammana 
continued to feel ill, yet his requests for medical treatment were 
refused. 
 
Mammana remained in the Yellow Room for four days.  
After he was released from the Yellow Room, a disciplinary 
hearing was held regarding Taylor’s report; the hearing board 
eventually concluded “there was no basis” for her report and 
the “charges” against Mammana were “expunged.”12  
Mammana remained in administrative segregation for four 
months after leaving the Yellow Room. 
 
B. Proceedings in the District Court 
 
                                              
7 Id. 
8 JA 44. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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Mammana filed suit in the District Court.  In his 
Amended Complaint, he set forth counts for malicious 
prosecution against the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Taylor, 
violation of due process against the Bureau, Taylor, and 
Barben, and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his 
Eighth Amendment rights against the Bureau and Barben.  
Defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, and 
Mammana withdrew all claims against the Bureau and Taylor.  
Parsing the Eighth Amendment claim, a magistrate judge 
recommended dismissal of Mammana’s claims for constant 
lighting, lack of exercise, and deprivation of food; he 
recommended that Mammana’s claim regarding the 
deprivation of warmth survive both dismissal and summary 
judgment. 
 
Mammana objected to the magistrate’s report and 
recommendation, and the District Court granted the motion to 
dismiss in its entirety, reasoning that Mammana had alleged 
only that the conditions of his confinement were 
“uncomfortabl[e].”13  Mammana timely appealed the dismissal 
of his Eighth Amendment claim. 
                                              
13 Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 4:17-cv-00645, 
2018 WL 4051703, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2018) (alteration 
in original). 
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II. Legal Standard14 
 Our review of the grant of a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is plenary.15  “To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”16  A claim is facially 
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”17  In assessing the factual 
content of the complaint, we disregard those allegations that 
“are no more than conclusions,” but “assume the[] veracity” of 
all “well-pleaded factual allegations.”18 
 
III. Discussion  
On appeal, Mammana contends that the District Court 
erred in dismissing his claim under the Eighth Amendment on 
the ground that the conditions of his confinement were merely 
uncomfortable.  Because he has alleged not just merely 
uncomfortable conditions, but the deprivation of a specific 
human need, we agree with Mammana regarding this issue and 
                                              
14 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
15 Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 n.2, 790 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
17 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
18 Id. at 679. 
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will vacate the dismissal of his claim under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
 
A.   Applicable Law  
The Eighth Amendment provides, “Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”19  The Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment applies to both an 
inmate’s formal sentence and to “deprivations that were not 
specifically part of the sentence, but were suffered during 
imprisonment.”20  However, because that prohibition is 
directed only toward “punishment,”21 it applies only to 
deprivations that constitute an “unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain,”22 including “those that are ‘totally without 
penological justification.’”23 
 
Wantonness, however, “does not have a fixed meaning 
but must be determined with ‘due regard for differences in the 
kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection 
is lodged.’”24  In challenges to prison conditions, such as the 
                                              
19 U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
20 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (citing Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). 
21 Id. at 300. 
22 Id. at 297 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104) (emphasis in 
original). 
23 Id. at 308 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 
(1981)). 
24 Id. at 302 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 
(1986)). 
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one here, “a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment 
only when two requirements are met.”25   
 
First, “the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, 
‘sufficiently serious,’”26 resulting in “the denial of ‘the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’”27  Although 
the Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable 
prisons,”28 “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive 
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.”29  In a 
challenge to those conditions, “the inmate must show that he is 
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of 
serious harm.”30  However, “[t]he proof necessary to show that 
there was a substantial risk of harm is less demanding than the 
proof needed to show that there was a probable risk of harm.”31   
 
Second, “a prison official must have a ‘sufficiently 
culpable state of mind.’”32  “In prison-conditions cases that 
state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health 
or safety . . . .”33  In that context, deliberate indifference 
requires that the  
                                              
25 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
26 Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). 
27 Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). 
28 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. 
29 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. 
30 Id. at 834 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 
(1993)). 
31 Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
32 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 
33 Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03). 
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prison official must both know of and disregard 
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.  
The . . . element of deliberate indifference is 
subjective, not objective . . . meaning that the 
official must actually be aware of the existence 
of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the 
official should have been aware.34   
 
In other words, “the official must both be aware of facts from 
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”35 
 
It is under this law that we analyze Mammana’s 
allegations.   
 
B. Analysis  
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether Mammana’s 
allegations regarding the conditions of his confinement satisfy 
the first prong under the Eighth Amendment—an objective 
deprivation of sufficient seriousness.  We conclude that 
Mammana has adequately alleged an excessive risk to inmate 
                                              
34 Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 
2005)  
(omissions in original) (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 
F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
35 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.   
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health and safety from the extreme and protracted deprivation 
of warmth and the ability to sleep presented in this case.36  
 
Mammana alleges that, for a continuous period over 
several days, he was denied clothing and bedding and 
subjected to low cell temperatures while his cell was constantly 
lit.  “Conditions . . . alone or in combination[] may deprive 
inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities.”37  As the Supreme Court has observed, “[s]ome 
conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth 
Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not 
do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing 
effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable 
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.”38   
 
 Mammana has alleged such “mutually enforcing” 
conditions.39  Mammana alleges that he was deprived of his 
clothing, provided only “paper like” coverings instead,40 
denied bedding, and exposed to low cell temperatures and 
constant bright lighting for four days.  The Supreme Court has 
explained that “a low cell temperature at night combined with 
a failure to issue blankets” could constitute an unconstitutional 
                                              
36 Mammana also argued in the District Court and on appeal 
that he was deprived of exercise and adequate meals.  The 
Amended Complaint, however, contains no allegations 
regarding either of those claims, and they were properly 
dismissed. 
37 Rhodes, 452 U.S at 347.   
38 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (emphasis omitted). 
39 Id. 
40 JA 44. 
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deprivation.41  Likewise, we have noted that denying a prisoner 
appropriate clothing with “no legitimate penological reason” 
may offend the Eighth Amendment.42  Mammana also claims 
that, as a result of these conditions, he could “hardly sleep,” 
and when he did fall asleep he would “wake up frequently 
shivering,”43 all of which caused him “to suffer physical and 
psychological harm.”44  “[S]leep is critical to human existence, 
and conditions that prevent sleep have been held to violate the 
Eighth Amendment.”45  Additionally, bright, constant 
                                              
41 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304; accord Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 
F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (“We have held that an Eighth 
Amendment claim may be established by proof that the inmate 
was subjected for a prolonged period to bitter cold.”). 
42 Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 229.  In Chavarriaga, we 
concluded, inter alia, that forcing a female inmate to walk 
“naked in plain view of male prison personnel and inmates to 
reach a shower” was “a malicious act intended to humiliate her 
for no legitimate penological reason” and constituted a 
deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.  We also concluded, 
however, that a claim under the Eighth Amendment could not 
be premised on the “mere[]” deprivation of clothing, especially 
where the inmate “was sheltered from the elements.”  Id. at 229 
(citing Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 443-47 (8th Cir. 1995)).  
That statement is consequently inapplicable to this case, as 
Mammana has alleged exposure to the elements—namely, the 
low temperatures of the Yellow Room. 
43 JA 44. 
44 JA 47.  
45 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2013); accord 
Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[S]leep 
undoubtedly counts as one of life’s basic needs.”). 
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illumination that causes “grave sleeping problems and other 
mental and psychological problems” can establish an Eighth 
Amendment deprivation.46  Together, Mammana’s alleged 
deprivations and exposure reflect more than the denial of a 
“comfortable prison[],”47 but rather the denial of “the minimal 
civilized measure of life’s necessities,”48 in particular, warmth 
and sufficient sleep. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand 
for further proceedings. 
                                              
46 Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
47 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). 
48 Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). 
